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EVERYDAY PROBLEMS IN THE TRIAL
OF AN AUTOMOBILE ACTION-
SuFL 0. ARNoLD**
The backlog of cases in the courts of metropolitan areas prompts
the question, "Do the judicial systems as they now function meet
today's needs ?" Chief Bolitha Laws answered the question by say-
ing:'
"One of the principal reasons why our court calendars are
clogged is because of the modem tendency to prolong trials.".2
Judge Laws says that we must stop men from over-trying cases;
"that if we are to meet the needs of today we must find a way in
which to try cases on short and simple issues and work with zeal to
clear up the congested dockets." 3
NECCESITY FOR PLEADING SPECIFIC
GROUNDS OF NEGLIGENCE
A navigator about to embark upon an ocean voyage studies maps
and charts and plots his course. The pilot of a jet airplane prepares
and files a flight plan and, before he leaves the airport, has chosen a
route which will guide him to his destination. In the same manner,
an able lawyer defines the issues in his complaint and thereby charts
his future course. It is true that pleading has been neglected by the
courts, but as our Supreme Court has pointed out,* the standing which
a lawyer has in the profession and before the courts depends in a con-
siderable degree upon the pleadings which he drafts.
In the Federal Court, particularly, pleading has become a lost art.5
* Adapted from a lecture delivered at a seminar of the Junior Bar Association
of Milwaukee on March 18, 1953.
•* L.L.B. University of Wisconsin 1924; Member Milwaukee Bar Association.
I PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 1951,
Page 16-17.
2 Judge Laws on this point said (Page 18, PROCEEDINGS OF SECrIONS OF INSUR-
ANCE LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 1951):
"I do not know whether you of the insurance section have had that
experience or not, but the lawyers of Washington are learning to
stretch the usual personal injury cases into a week or ten days. I just
do not understand it. When I came to the bar we used to try such cases
in a day or a day and a half. It seems to me that a personal injury
case should not require ten days, or fifteen days to try."
3 PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION OF INSURANCE LAW, AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATIoN; 1951,
Page 20, where Judge Laws also said:
"We must have men who know how to introduce evidence in court,
how to split the wheat from the chaff, how to prevent the split into col-lateral issues, how to stop an ambitious person from making a career
out of a case, and finally how to stop men from overtrying cases."
4Lukken v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. 194 Wis. 569, 576-577, 217 N.W. 404 (1928).
5 Professor 0. L. McCaskill "The Modern Philosophy of Pleading" 38 A.B.A.J.,
Page 123 (1952) Diogoardi v. Durning 1939 F 2d 774, 775; Discussion by the
Judges of the Eighth Circuit on the need for amendment of Rule 8(a) (2)
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Indeed, the recommended form for stating a claim in a personal in-
jury action6 does not require the specific grounds of negligence to be
alleged.
Our Supreme Court has recently stated that the specific grounds
of negligence must be pleaded and that evidence of negligence in
pleadings is inadmissible unless such proof does not operate to the
disadvantage of the defendant.7
At the risk of oversimplification, we suggest the following as
examples of good pleading:
"The collision (or accident) was caused by the negligence
of the defendant in the following respects:
"a. He operated his automobile at an excessive rate of
speed.
"b. He failed to maintain a proper lookout.
"c. He failed properly to keep his automobile under control.8
"d. He failed to yield the right of way to the plaintiff.9
"e. He failed to give an audible signal of his intention to
pass before passing or attempting to pass a vehicle pro-
ceeding in the same direction in violation of Subsection
(1) of Section 85.16 of the Statutes.
"f. He deviated from the traffic lane in which he was
traveling without first ascertaining whether such move-
ment could be made with safety to vehicles approaching
from the rear, in violation of Subsection (2) of Sec-
tion 85.16 of the Statutes.
"g. He failed to give a signal of his intention to turn to
the left (or to the right, or into a private road or
driveway) in violation of Sections 85.17, 85.175, and
85.176 of the Statutes."
A complaint, which alleges that the defendant "violated the
ordinances of the City of Milwaukee and the Statutes of the State of
Wisconsin in such cases made and provided," is subject to a motion
to strike or to make more definite and certain. 0
FRCP, 13 FRD 253. Chief Judge Jankowitz of the United States DistrictCourt for the Southern District of California in "Chief Characteristics of
Federal Trial Practice" 12 FRD 269, 275, 279 insists that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure as properly interpreted requires a plaintiff to allege facts
sufficient to show that he has a legal claim against the defendant. See also
Chief Judge James Alger Fee "The Lost Horizon in Pleading under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" 48 CAL. LAW REvmw 491, 495 (1948).6 See Form No. 9, Rules of Federal Procedure adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in 193&
7 Cook v. Wis. Tel. Co. 263 Wis. 56, 62, 56 N.W. 2d 494 (1953) ; Miller v. Ke-
nosha Electric R. Co. 135 Wis. 68, 115 N.W. 355 (1908) ; Tolleman v. Sheboy-
gan LP & R. Co. 148 Wis. 197, 134 N.W. 406 (1912).8 No Wisconsin decision but see Words and Phrases.
9 This applies at intersections, but only in those cases where the plaintiff ap-proaches the intersection on the defendant's right. Reynolds v. Madison Bus
Co. 250 Wis. 294. 26 N.W. 2d 653 (1947).
10 WIs. STATS. (1951) §§263.43, 263.44; Maxwell v. Fink 264 Wis. 106, 58 N.W.
2nd 415, 418 (1953).
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If the defendant is guilty of gross negligence and ordinary negli-
gence, both may be alleged in the same complaint but they must be
pleaded as separate causes of action."'
If the defendant is insured and the insufance policy was issued
in Wisconsin, the insurance company may be made the sole defendant
in an action in the state courts.12 It is at least doubtful whether the
insurance company can be made the sole defendant in the Federal
Courts."3 If there "is a policy defense, the insured is a necessary party
under the state court practice and an indispensable party under the
Federal Rues of Civil Procedure.' 4 The Federal Court, therefore,
will lose jurisdiction in a diversity, of citizenship case unless there
is also diversity, of citizenship between the plaintiff and the insured.'5
If the insurance policy is written outside the State of Wisconsin
and in a state where the no-action clause is 'good, the insurance com-
pany cannot be joined as a party 'defendant. 6
Before joining the insurance company as a party defendant in a
case brought .by the named insured, counsel for the plaintiff should
study the insurance policy to determine whether it excludes coverage
for injuries sustained by the named insured. 17  Counsel for the
plaintiff should also determine whether the policy excludes coverage
in a case brought by the employer of the named insured against a
fellow employee.' 8
Where it is questionable whether the insurance company can be
made a party, and where no notice has been served under Section
330.19 (5) of the Statutes, the insured should be joined as a party
defendant. If the action against the insura.nce company is dismissed
more than two years after the cause of action has accrued, it is proba-
ble that the court will hold that an action against the insured is barred
"2 Nelson v. American Employers Insurance Co. 262 Wis. 271, 55 N.W. 2d 13(1952).
12 Elliott v. Indemnity Insurance Company 201 Wis. 445, 448, 230 N.W. 87(1930); Oertel v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. 214 Wis. 68, 72, 251 N.W. 465 (1933);
Kujawa v. American Indemnity Co. 245 Wis. 361, 363-364, 14 N.W. 2d 31(1944).
"13An insurance company may be joined as a party defendant only because of
the enactment of Chapter 375 of the Laws of 1931 which amended Section
260.11(1) of the Statutes by adding the last sentence. The Statute as amended
authorized the joinder of an insurance company as a party defendant in an
automobile case. Lang v. Baumann 213 Wis. 258, 251 N.W. 464 (1933) ; Oer-
tel v. Fidelity and Casualty Company 214 Wis. 68, 251 N.W. 465 (1933). The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not contain a provision authorizing thejoinder of an insurance company as a party defendant.
'. Calhoun v. Western Casualty Company 260 Wis. 34, 49 N.W. 2d 911 (1951).
'5 Barron and Halthoff "Federal Practice and Procedure," §515; DeKorwin v.
First National Bank 156 F. 2d 858, 7th Cir., (1946).
16 Ritterbusch v. Sexsmith 256 Wis. 507, 41 N.W. 2d 611 (1950).
17 Frye v. Thiege 253 Wis. 596, 601-602, 34 N.W. 2d 793 (1948).
38 Ainsworth v. Berg 253 Wis. 438, 445, 34 N.W. 2d 790 (1948). Compare Mc
Mann v. Faulstich 259 Wis. 7, 12, 47 N.W. 2d 317 (1951).
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because of the failure to comply with Section 330.19 (5) of the
Statutes. 119
The plaintiff's counsel must consider the advisability of joining
the named insured or omnibus insured as a party defendant. If the
plaintiffs are husband and wife, and if both have the same attorney,
the spouse driver cannot be joined as a defendant because the at-
torney would be in an inconsistent position. Many practitioners, in-
cluding some of the older lawyers, occasionally forget that they can-
not represent the plaintiff driver in one case and make him a de-
fendant in another case.
Where there are two or more joint tortfeasors, counsel for the
defendant may wish to cross-complain for contribution. The right
to contribution arises only in cases of common liability.20 Where an
employee, who is injured in the course of employment and who is
subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act, brings an action for
personal injuries against the third party, there is no right to contri-
bution. The Workmen's Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy
for the employee. There is no common liability which will permit
contribution from the employer in an action by the employee against
the third party.21 Where a 'iother or father brings an action for
damage to an automobile owned by them and operated by an un-
emancipated minor child, a tortfeasor defendant has no right of con-
tribution since a parent cannot sue an unemancipated minor child.
22
Where a husband brings an action for damage to his automobile caused
while his wife is driving, the person operating the automobile with
which the husband's automobile collides has no right of contribution
because the husband cannot sue his wife for property damage.23 The
right to contribution does not exist in case the husband brings an
action for personal injuries caused by his wife's negligence.24
When an action for personal injuries is commenced more than two
years after the cause of action has accrued, the plaintiff should allege
that notice has been given under Section 330.19 (5) Statutes. 2 5
A cause of action for contribution is not bottomed upon Section
330.19(9) of the Statutes and may be maintained even though no
notice has been served under that statute. 26
29 Doucha v. Mayer, 249 Wis. 453, 25 N.W. 2d 80 (1946).
20 Ellis v. Chicago and NW Ry. Co. 167 Wis. 392, 409-410, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918).
21 Britt v. Buggs 201 Wis. 533, 230 N.W. 621 (1930).
22 Munsert v. Farmer Mut. Auto Ins. Co. 229 Wis. 581, 586, 281 N.W. 671 (1938).
23 WIs. STATS. (1951) §246.075.
24 WIs. STATS. (1951) §246.075.
25 The requirements of notice applies to minors as well as adults. Voss v. Tittel
219 Wis. 175, 262 N.W. 579 (1935).
26Ainsworth v. Berg 253 Wis. 438, 34 N.W. 2d 793 (1948) which overruled
Palmer v. Auto Mutual Insurance Co. 234 Wis. 287, 291 N.W. 364 (1940).
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PREPARATION FOR TRIAL
1. Investigation
Lawsuits are usually won or lost long before the case is actually
called for trial. Success in court depends upon the investigation; if
the case has been properly investigated, the outcome may usually be
predicted. A competent investigation serves two purposes: first, it
enables the lawyer to appraise the value of the case and to make an
intelligent settlement of the case if that is possible; second, if it be-
comes necessary to try the case the trial lawyer will have the facts
necessary to win the case. These statements have been made so
many times that they may seem commonplace. The subject of in-
vestigation is too important and too specialized to be considered at
length here. We suggest that every trial lawyer should read, "What a
Trial Lawyer Should Find in an Investigation File," by Hon.
Clarence W. Heyl. 27
2. Negotiations for Settlement
Negotiations for settlement may take different forms depending
upon the locality in which the attorneys practice. Some lawyers do not
discuss a settlement until a concilation hearing or a pre-trail con-
ference is had under the supervision of a trial judge. There is no
reason for postponing negotiations for settlement. The overwhelm-
ing majority of insurance companies prefer to settle claims without
court expense. In most cases, except where there is a question of
liability, or where there is a policy defense, there should not be a
substantial difference between the plaintiff's counsel and the insurance
company's counsel as to the settlement value of the case. From
the standpoint of public relations, it is essential for counsel to co-
operate in order to relieve congestion in the courts. It is incumbent
upon attorneys, therefore, to exhaust settlement possibilities without
infringing upon the time of trial judges.
In conducting settlement negotiations, the attorneys upon both
sides must be honest and above-board. Occasionally plaintiff's coun-
sel may deceive an insurance company. It is also possible that a sharp
defendant's counsel may drive an unconscionable bargain. In the long
run, however, such successes will react against the guilty party. The
lawyer may then find that he is on the "list" of plaintiff's attorneys or
insurance attorneys and his road thereafter will be rough and rugged.
Courtesy and fair dealing still pay large dividends.
3 Discovery Procedure
Wisconsin, unlike many other states, has had discovery statutes
27 A speech delivered at the 16th Annual Convention of National Association of
Independent Insurance Adjusters, June 18-20, 1953 at San Francisco. Mr.
Heyl is a past chairman of the Insurance Section of the American Bar Asso-
ciation and is a member of the firm of Heyl, Royster & Voelker, Peoria, Ill.
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for many years. Older practitioners still refer to a "Section 4096 ex-
amination." Younger members of the bar refer to an adverse examina-
tion under Section 326.12 of the Statutes.
The purpose of an adverse examination is twofold. In the first
place, the adversary wants to find out everything that the party ex-
amined knows about the case. The second purpose is to outline the
issues in the case.28
Adverse examinations can be expedited if the pleadings have been
properly drawn and frame the issues. Items of special damages and a
description of personal injuries can thereby be .promptly secured.
Attorneys continually attempt to obtain the names of witnesses in
discovery examinations conducted in state court actions. This question
has not been directly passed upon in Wisconsin. Many lawyers feel
that a party is not obliged to disclose the names of witnesses. Under
Rule 26, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the names of witnesses
can be secured if the action is brought in the Federal Court.
A plaintiff sometimes requests an insurance company to permit
inspection of a statement hie has given. It has been held that the plain-
tiff may compel the production of such a statement for purposes of
making a copy.29
If it happens that the party examined is a minor and no guardian
ad litem has been appointed, the examination should be immediately
halted. The adverse examination'of such minor cannot be used at the
trial.30
Under Section 326.12 of the Wisconsin Statutes, only parties or
their agents or the persons on whose behalf or interest the action is
brought may be adversely examined. In certain circumstances a fellow
employee may be examined adversely in an action brought by an em-
ployee against a third party.31
Under Rule 26, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any person
whether a party or a witness may be examined for the purpose of dis-
covery.
Statements of employees and witnesses need not be produced under
the Wisconsin practice, either at an adverse examination or under
Section 269.57 of the Statutes.3 2 Under the federal practice, however,
such statements must be produced and in exceptional circumstances
28 Compare Maxwell v. Fink supra note 10.
29 WIs. STATS. (1951) §269.57; Walsh v. Northland Greyhound Lines, Inc. 244
Wis. 281, 12 N.W. 2d 20 (1943).
SO Will of Jaeger 218 Wis. 1, 10, 259 N.W. 842 (1935).
31 Empl. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Icke 225 Wis. 304, 274 N.W. 283 (1937).
32 Hamilton v. Reinemann 233 Wis. 572, 587, 290 N.W. 194 (1940); Bell v. Milw.
E.R. & L. Co. 169 Wis. 408, 172 N.W. 791 (1919); Lehan v. C. & NW Ry. Co.
169 Wis. 327, 172 N.W. 787 (1919).
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even the work product of a lawyer may be subject to production and
inspection. 3
Attorneys sometimes forget that a guardian ad litem or a brother
attorney cannot be examined adversely under Section 326.12 of the
Statutes.3 4
Before leaving the subject of an adverse or discovery examina-
tion, we suggest that every attorney owes a duty to the party examined
to describe the adverse or discovery examination. The person to be
examined should be told that he will appear before a Court Commis-
sioner or a Notary Public; that he will be sworn; that he will be ques-
tioned by the opposing counsel; that the purpose of the examination
is to obtain the story of the person examined; that if he is a party
one of the purposes will be to obtain admissions against interest; that
his answers will be taken down in shorthand or on a stenographic
machine and will ultimately appear in a typewritten transcript. The
person examined should also be told that the transcript of the adverse
or discovery examination will be used at the trial by the party con-
ducting the examination.
MEDICAL EVIDENCE
3 5
1. Discovery Procedure
Section 269.57 (2) of the Statutes provides that the court may re-
quire the plaintiff to submit to a medical examination. The Statute
is permissive and not mandatory. In Leusink v. O'Donnell,36 the court
in effect held that the Statute was mandatory and that a party is en-
titled to have a medical examination of his adversary. The court also
held that an order should be entered requiring the plaintiff to con-
sent in writing to the inspection by the defendent of hospital and
nurses' records.
33 The Federal Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin regularly requires
production of statements of employees and witnesses. In the leading case of
Hickman v. Taylor 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the United States Supreme Court
held that in certain circumstances it may be necessary to require the lawyer
to produce a portion of his work product for inspection. This case has given
rise to a great deal of consternation on the part of lawyers who carefully pre-
pare their cases for trial. No one has yet suggested any cogent reason why
the discovery procedure should be used to penalize the case-painstaking lawyer.
34 Rohleder v. Wright 162 Wis. 580, 156 N.W. 955 (1916).
35 For a general discussion of medical evidence the following are recommended:
"The Medical Expert" by Edward D. Bronson, Panel on Expert Testimony
1952, Page 12, published by the Section of Insurance Law, American Bar
Association; "The Medical Witness Preparedness and Examination" by Raoul
D. Magona, Panel on Trial Tactics 1951, Page 33, published by the Section of
Insurance Law, American Bar Association; "Some Strategic Aspects of Cross
Examination of Neuropsychosis Testimony in Personal Injury Cases" by Ha-
bert Winston Smith, Proceedings of the Section of Insurance Law, Ameri-
can Bar Association 1950, Page 198; "Expert Medical Opinion Evidence with
Reference to Automobile Damage Cases" by Oscar T. Toebass, Past President,
Wisconsin Bar Association, Proceedings of the Section of Insurance Law
1947, Page 130.
36 255 Wis. 627, 39 N.W. 2d 675 (1949).
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2. Qualifications of Medical Experts
The physician in a sister state cannot testify as an expert under
Section 147.14 (2) of the Statutes except in behalf of a Wisconsin
resident and then only where no other testimony is available."
In the Federal Court in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Judge
Tehan regularly permits physicians licensed in sister states to testify
for non-resident parties. If therefore the plaintiff is a resident of a
sister state and the requisite amount in controversy exists, plaintiff's
counsel should consider instituting the action in the Federal Court in
order to expedite introduction of medical testimony.
3. Admissibility in Evidence of History Given by the Patient
Where the medical examination is made for the sole purpose of
testifying, the history given by the patient is not admissible.38 In
Mader v. Boehm,30 the court permitted the history given to a doctor,
examining the patient for the purposes of testifying, only to be ad-
missible where the history recited had been introduced in evidence by
testimony under oath of another witness. It may be that this case has
been overruled by the Schields case.
It has been held that where an examination has been made after
suit has been started, or after a determination that a suit would be
started, the examining physician cannot testify as to the history even
though one of the purposes of the examination is for treatment.40
4. Physician's Privilege
Under Section 325.21 of the Statutes, the court held that the
physician's exemption from disclosure should in reason be limited to
such disclosure as would injure the patient's feelings and reputation.'1
Where a medical witness has been called, the party calling him
waives the privilege of other physicians who have treated such
party.42
Two other points in connection with medical testimony may be
briefly noted. The first is that the failure to call a physician who has
treated a party may be a subject of comment to the jury.43 The second
37Morril v. Komasinski 256 Wis. 417, 41 N.W. 2d 620 (1950). (Holding that an
Osteopath may testify for a Wisconsin resident.) Landrath v. Allstate In-
surance Company 259 Wis. 248, 257-258, 48 N.W. 2d 485 (1951). (Holding
that a Minneapolis physician may be permitted to testify where he was con-
sulted by a Wisconsin physician to assist treating a Wisconsin patient)
38 Schields v. Fredrick 232 Wis. 595, 288 N.W. 241 (1939).
39213 Wis. 55, 250 N.W. 854 (1933).
40 Kath v. Wis. Central R. Co. 121 Wis. 503, 512, 99 N.W. 217 (1904).
4 1 Leusink v. O'Donnell 255 Wis. 627, 39 N.W. 2d 698 (1949).
42 Cretney v. Woodmen Accident Co. 196 Wis. 29, 35-36, 219 N.W. 448 (1928).
The case of Cohodes v. M & M L. & T. Co. 149 Wis. 308, 312-313, 135 N.W.
879 (1912) to the contrary is no longer the law because of the subsequent
amendment to §325.21 of the Statutes.
43 Naus v. C & M E. R. Co. 185 Wis. 178, 181, 201 N.W. 281 (1924).
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is that a plaintiff may recover although his condition is diagnosed as
a traumatic neurosis.""
TRIAL OF THE ActioN
A trial brief, including the form of the proposed special verdict,
should be furnished to the court at the opening of the trial. Many
judges permit the trial brief to be filed without giving a copy to the
opposing counsel. If the court disapproves of this practice, the trial
brief may be used solely for the convenience of the attorney who
drafted it. If trial briefs were required in very case, the trial of most
cases would be shortened, and the character of performance by the
attorneys would be improved.
Rough diagrams may be introduced in evidence to show the lo-
cation, generally, of various objects at the scene of an accident. Where,
however, the drawings are used for the purpose of affirmative evi-
dence, i.e. as to physical possibilities or impossibilities, or to show
distances, the drawing must be to scale.45 An Elkhorn lawyer uses
drawings made to scale and has had manufactured a rubber stamp
representation of an automobile to scale.
Where an attempt is made to use admissions contained in a com-
plaint which is later amended, it is necessary to offer the first com-
plaint in evidence. When the amended complaint is filed, the former
complaint drops out of the case.4 6
If a party is compelled to use a witness who has been convicted
of a criminal offense, he may be asked, on his examination in chief,
whether he has been convicted of a criminal offense and thereafter
he cannot be cross examined as to the nature of the offense.47
Attorneys are at times charged with putting leading questions. It
has been held in Nickel v. State8 that the question, "Now what, if
anything, did the defendent say about .. .," was not a leading question
because it did not call for a yes or no answer. In Malone v. State,49
it was held that a question, "What is the fact . . . as to whether or
not" a statement was made, did not constitute a leading question.
Nevertheless, some judges frown upon whether or not questions and
consider them to be leading.
Attempts are sometimes made to minimize damages by showing
that the injured party received Workmens Compensation or carried
accident or hospital insurance. Objections are also made to items of
damage, such as gratuitous services by members of the family, or
44Landrath v. Allstate Insurance Co. 259 Wis. 248, 48 N.W. 2d 485 (1951).
45 Schwellenbach v. Wagner 258 Wis. 526, 531-532, 46 N.W. 2d 852 (1951).
46 Dixon v. Davidson 202 Wis. 19, 22, 231 N.W. 276 (1930).
47Wis. STATS. (1951) §325.19; State v. Adams 257 Wis. 433, 435, 43 N.W. 2d 446(1950).
48205 Wis. 614, 238 N.W. 508 (1931).
49 192 Wis. 379, 388, 212 N.W. 879 (1927).
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by friends, or by physicians. The rule has long been established in
Wisconsin that the injured party is entitled to be compensated for
the injury actually sustained and for the reasonable cost of services
rendered, whether gratuitous or paid for.5 0
It has been held that evidence that a driver is a good or bad
driver is not admissible especially where such driver is deceased."'
There is sometimes apprehension concerning the use of an adverse
examination at ,the time of the trial. Section 326.12, Statutes specifi-
cally provides that the adverse examination can be used only by the
party who took it. The question, as to whether the adverse examina-
tion can be used in the event of the death or absence of a party, does
not seem to have been squarely passed upon.5 2 The party taking the
adverse examination may read parts of the testimony into evidence as
a part of this case without calling the party examined to the witness
stand. A party called adversely may be examined by his own counsel
immediately after testifying on adverse examination on matters testi-
fied to by the witness. 53
A very troublesome question is presented as to the admissibility
in evidence of the statements of employees of a corporate defendant.
It is well established that such statements may not be introduced in
evidence as admissions by the corporation against interest where they
are not part of the res gestae.54 Nevertheless, statements made by such
employees may be brought to the attention of the employee who made
them upon his cross examination for the purpose of contradicting
and impeaching the witness. A proper instruction, however, must be
given to the jury that such statements are not substantive evidence.
Such statements, of course, cannot furnish the basis of a verdict
against the corporate defendant.
Statements of an injured person, made within seventy-two hours
after the accident, are admissible in evidence under Section 325.28 of
the Statutes where given to an officer or a third party having no
interest in the litigation.55
50 Campbell v. Sutliff 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374 (1927); Papenfuss v. Shell
Oil Co. 254 Wis. 233, 238-239, 35 N.W. 2d 920 (1949).51 Zastrow v. Schaumberger 210 Wis. 116, 125-126, 245 N.W. 202 (1932).52 Lange v. Heckel 171 Wis. 59; 175 N.W. 788 (1920); Lamberson v. Lamberson
175 Wis. 398, 411, 184 N.W. 708 (1921); Estate of Shinoe 212 Wis. 481, 486,
250 N.W. 505 (1933): F. H. Bresler v. Bauer 212 Wis. 386, 248 N.W. 788(1933).
53 DeVries v. Dye 222 Wis. 501, 269, N.W. 270 (1936).54 Hamilton v. Reinemann 233 Wis. 572, 290 N.W. 194 (1940) ; Lehan v. Chicago
& N. W. R. Co. 169 Wis. 327, 172 N.W. 787 (1919); Bell v. Milwaukee E. R. &
L. Co. 169 Wis. 408, 414, 172 N.W. 791 (1919).
55 Kirsch v. Pomisal 236 Wis. 264, 267, 294 N.W. 865 (1940) ; Losching v. Fisher
237 Wis. 193, 295 N.W. 712 (1941); Hoffman v. Labutzke 238 Wis. 164, 171,
298 N.W. 583 (1941) ; Zastrow v. Schaumberger 210 Wis. 116, 125, 245 N.W.
202 (1932).
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Under Section 327.18 of the Statutes and Jacobson v. Bryon,56
only that part of the police and sheriff's reports which consist of
observations made by the officer are admissible in evidence in the
courts in Wisconsin. Under the Federal Business Records Act,57 such
reports are admissible in toto in the Federal Courts.
58
Where a party uses a statement given by the adversary for pur-
poses of impeachment, and calls a portion of the statement to the
witness' attention, counsel for the party who gave the statement has the
right to introduce the entire statement in evidence, although the state-
ment may contain evidence otherwise inadmissible.59
Damages to an automobile may be proved only by showing the fair
market value of the car before the accident and the fair market value
of the car after the accident. If the attorney desires to measure dam-
ages by the repair bill, he should obtain a stipulation to that effect
from opposing counsel.
In practically every case involving damage to an automobile, wit-
nesses testify as to the condition of the automobile after the accident.
Counsel should be alert to object to such testimony, unless a founda-
tion has been laid to show that at the time the witness saw the car it
was in the same condition as it was immediately after the collision. 60
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case the defendent should move
for a non-suit. After both sides have rested one of the parties should
ask the court to declare the evidence closed. If this is not done, a
party has the right to introduce additional evidence after motions have
been made and argued for a directed verdict. In every case, the defen-
dant should move for a directed verdict unless he does not desire the
court to determine the issues of negligence and damage. In the Fed-
eral Court a motion for directed verdict, if denied, does not destroy
the right of either party to have the case submitted to the jury.6 1
Although the Statutes do not require objections to be made at the
time of instructions to the jury, it is better practice for the attorney
to make such objections in the absence of the jury after the court
has completed his instructions. The form of a special verdict rests in
the sound discretion of the trial court,62 but specific issues only
should be submitted to the jury.6 3 Objections to the special verdict
must be made before the case goes to the jury.64
56 244 Wis. 359, 12 N.W. 2d 789 (1944).
5728 U.S.C. §1732.58 McKee v. Jamestown Baking Co. 198 F. 2d 551, 556 3rd Cir. (1952).
59 Dillenberg v. Carroll 259 Wis. 417, 49 N.W. 2d 444 (1951).
60 Geason v. Schaefer 229 Wis. 8, 11, 281 N.W. 681 (1938).
61 Rule 50(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
62Garcia v. C & N. W. R. Co. 256 Wis. 633, 637, 42 N.W. 2d 288 (1950).
G3Stellmacher v. Wisco Hdwe. Co. 259 Wis. 310, 314, 48 N.W 2d 492 (1951);
Matuschka v Murphy 173 Wis. 484, 487, 180 N.W. 821 (1921).
64 Johnson v. Sipe 263 Wis. 191, 56 N.W. 2d 852, 856 (1953).
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CONCLUSION
The congestion in our trial courts can and will be eliminated. But
the judges alone cannot be expected to do the job. There must be
wholehearted cooperation on the part of the bar. To be helpful, law-
yers must be prepared. Despite his best efforts, there are times when
a lawyer is thrown into the trial of a case where he has not had a
chance fully to prepare for trial. This paper is designed to help such
a lawyer. If such purpose is achieved, it is hoped that those benefited
will in their turn take the time to make a similar contribution.
